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1 
SITUATIONAL ETHICS AND VEGANISM 
NEIL H. BUCHANAN 
Sherry Colb and Michael Dorf’s Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights 
is an essential work, exploring an unexpected overlap between two seemingly 
unrelated areas of ethics and the law. They make strong affirmative cases for the 
pro-choice and animal rights sides of those two respective debates, showing why 
it is possible—indeed, morally required—to believe simultaneously that 
abortion should not be banned and that consuming animal products is immoral. 
Although their arguments are important on their own merits, it is useful to 
emphasize that this book is in a very real sense a riposte, an answer to an 
accusation that goes like this: Vegans cannot truly believe in their stated reason 
for refusing to participate in animal cruelty. If they did, they would also be anti-
choice, because the same moral imperative that supposedly motivates vegans—
revulsion at the thought of inflicting pain and death on beings that have feelings 
and that have the right to live their lives—would require vegans to reject 
abortion as well. 
The Colb-Dorf book responds to that accusation masterfully, by centering 
their embrace of animal rights on the sentience of the beings at issue, a quality 
not shared by the vast majority of fetuses subject to abortion. I should also note 
that the argument to which they are responding amounts to a dare. We dare you, 
say those who attack vegans, to face up to the consequences of your moral 
claims. Disavow your arguments for veganism, or admit that you are hypocrites.  
The versions of this attack that I have seen invariably boil down to a person 
saying, “I think you really care more about being pro-choice, so stop pretending 
that you’re so high and mighty with your animal rights nonsense!” 
Interestingly, there is a distinct asymmetry to the argument. A person is 
supposedly required to accept the claim that bans on abortion are an inexorable 
result of animal rights arguments, but anti-choice people are somehow not 
expected to become vegans. That is why the accusation so frequently comes 
across as a debate maneuver rather than a sincere argument. But the argument 
also amounts to a dare because it carries with it an insinuation that animals are 
so obviously unimportant that liberals will admit to being insincere about their 
commitment to animal rights if they are forced to realize that the cost of a sincere 
commitment to animals is to reject reproductive rights for women. As an 
interesting (and equally illogical) corollary, a person who is pro-choice might 
try to use the argument as an excuse not to become a vegan. 
 
 Professor of Law, The George Washington University School of Law. 
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The Colb-Dorf book, therefore, is a particularly important entry into the canon 
of responses to anti-vegan arguments. As a vegan myself, I am keenly aware of 
the full range of those arguments, and Beating Hearts fills what had been 
potentially troubling gaps in the scholarly literature and in the ability of vegans 
to argue our positions as effectively as possible. 
Here, I want to take the opportunity to address a different argument against 
veganism, an argument that was not directly implicated by the issues in the Colb-
Dorf book but that is in the same spirit of the type of arguments to which Colb 
and Dorf are responding: non-vegans trying to prove that vegans are logically 
inconsistent. 
Vegans believe that it is wrong to consume animal products because those 
products are inevitably the result of cruelty. Those who wish to reject the logic 
of veganism frequently look for exceptional cases, to try to poke holes in the 
anti-cruelty ethic. If they can show that there are situations in which it would be 
ethical to consume animal products, they believe that the case against veganism 
is fatally compromised. 
The high school debate-style version of this argument goes something like 
this: If an animal happened to walk onto my property and died of natural causes 
in front of my house, my consumption of its remains would neither inflict pain 
on a sentient being nor shorten its natural life. And because it is acceptable to 
eat meat in that situation, we have to admit that it is not unacceptable to eat meat. 
Somewhat more sophisticated variations on this argument are surprisingly 
common. Indeed, during the brief time that I was a vegetarian and not a vegan, 
I came up with this argument to justify my intermediate stance: I would 
personally be unwilling to slaughter an animal and prepare its carcass to be 
cooked and consumed as meat, so I am unwilling to pay other people to do my 
killing for me. On the other hand, I would be perfectly willing, if it were ever to 
become necessary, to care for a dairy cow and milk her, or to keep chickens in 
my yard and use their eggs. Paying someone else to do those things is thus a 
matter of convenience and nothing more. 
The reason that this argument is ultimately the same as the argument 
regarding an animal dying on my property is that both rely on the denial of 
reality. Just as virtually all meat that people consume comes from animals that 
were brutally killed, almost all dairy products that people consume come from 
animals that have been treated with unspeakable cruelty. Justifying consumption 
of any of those products on the basis that they could have been produced in a 
humane way—a factual assertion that might not even be true, by the way—is a 
way of saying that it does not matter what we do so long as we can tell a story 
about reaching the same destination via an ethical path. 
It is, in other words, wrong to say that we can do anything we want so long as 
we can spin a good tale. It matters that we avoid inflicting actual harm. Brief 
consideration of three simple analogies will help to clarify this idea. 
We know that stealing from someone is wrong. Suppose, however, that you 
really wish that you possessed five hundred dollars that Person A possesses. If 
A is a doting aunt, she might give you that money without your even asking. Or 
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you could simply ask A to give you the money as a gift, and she might say yes. 
Failing that, you could tell A that you are willing to repair the fence that has 
fallen apart in her backyard, if she will pay you five hundred dollars. 
In other words, there are several ways in which you could morally and legally 
come into possession of A’s money. What does that imply? Outside of the 
veganism debate, the obvious implication is merely that a person who receives 
the money for one of those reasons is on solid moral ground, whereas a person 
who takes the money from A without her permission is a thief. Applying the 
anti-vegan logic, however, we would conclude that because there are ways in 
which you could end up with A’s money, it does not matter that the way you 
actually ended up with her money is not on that list of acceptable methods. 
Or we can consider an even more loaded example. Suppose that person B 
finds person C to be sexually attractive, and B wants to have intercourse with C. 
What can B do? B could seek an introduction and try to woo C, which could 
result in C’s acceptance of B’s advances. Under some ethical systems, B could 
also pay C money and C could accept payment as a quid pro quo for engaging 
in intercourse. But it would not be acceptable for B to force C to engage in sex 
unwillingly. And that is true even though there are imaginable situations in 
which B could have had sex with C without being a rapist. 
Finally, consider what is in some ways the most direct analogy to consuming 
meat. There are many well-known situations in which it is morally acceptable 
for one person to kill another person. Self-defense, the law of war, and mercy 
killing are all active areas of debate among ethicists, but nearly everyone admits 
that at least some killings of one human being by another human being are 
morally justified. As above, however, that does not somehow become a general 
license to kill. Killing people is justified only when it is justified, and the 
existence of such justifications does not make Ted Bundy or the Son of Sam 
anything other than serial murderers. 
The point is that my argument above—that I could have consumed dairy 
products at the end of an ethical series of actions—is ultimately a dodge. The 
milk, cheese, and eggs that I was consuming were the result of cruelty, and being 
able to describe an alternative cruelty-free universe does not change the reality 
of my participation in cruelty in this one. Similarly, although it is true that meat 
could be taken from a dead animal that never experienced a day of cruelty in its 
life, that is not a justification for eating the meat that one buys in stores. 
It is important to emphasize, moreover, that my argument here does not apply 
only to factory-farmed animal products. Even so-called cruelty-free eggs and 
other compromises suggested by animal welfare activists (“happy meat”) still 
involve cruelty—the infliction of pain and death. The animal welfare-versus-
rights debate is beyond the scope of this short comment, but in the context of my 
argument here, the degree of the cruelty is beside the point. 
Those who wish to avoid the logic of veganism are surprisingly tireless in 
their efforts to justify their decisions. Many of their arguments amount to saying, 
“Well, you’re not really more ethical than I am.” But when the argument 
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becomes, “I can do this in any way that I want, because there is a way to do this 
blamelessly,” the normal rules of logic have given way to wishful thinking. 
 
